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The United States Military's Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime
Transnational criminal threats and illicit trafficking networks continue to expand dramatically in size, scope, and influence-posing significant national security challenges for the United States and our partner countries. These threats cross borders and continents and undermine the stability of nations.
-United States National Security Strategy, May 2010
The international system has profoundly changed during the professional lives of most of today's security practitioners and policymakers. Beginning after the Second World War, and accelerating through the first decade of the Twenty First Century, the international systems of diplomacy, information, cooperative security, and economics fundamentally changed and have become progressively more globalized. 1 These changes may not be permanent, but almost no one expects the strategic environment to remain stagnant. Fueled by increasing multi functional and cross cultural interdependence, it is clear that the disintermediation of economic resources and information systems, the transformation in trade, commerce, societal norms, security, and technology all contribute to both cause and effect in an international system moving towards increased globalism. Concurrent with these developments has been the "parallel globalization of organized crime, violence, murder, and kidnappings related to illicit trafficking." 2 Transnational organized crime (TOC) has evolved into a capricious and potentially destabilizing menace to the personal security of ordinary citizens as well as to regional security in key parts of the world, and to the sovereignty of some at-risk partner states. 3 The risks of TOC go beyond international borders and challenge the stability, sovereignty, and legitimacy of important United States partner states.
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Transnational criminal organizations (TCO) try to leverage weaknesses in both the structure and effectiveness of government institutions in at-risk states in order to build up enormous capital and sway through trafficking and other unlawful actions.
Some of these originations have extended networks that have fully compromised "lawful financial systems and institutions in order to undercut commercial markets." 4 In fragile and at-risk states, these networks increase their "influence via cartels that subvert or coopt government officials and some state security apparatuses." 5 The confluence of TCO and violent extremist organizations (VEO) is one of ways and means rather than ends and objectives. This potentiality for confluence is important in that TCO and VEO will use similar methods, tactics, techniques, and procedures, but their motivations and goals are seen as distinct. This confluence represents a grave threat as "violent extremists seek to use existing criminal networks for logistical support and funding." 6 As vulnerable states are compromised and governmental infrastructure suborned, the more sophisticated crime networks have added cyber crime to their portfolios. These activities can cost consumers and businesses billions of dollars annually, "while undermining global confidence in the international financial system" 7 and the security sector of many partner states.
The very transnational nature of modern organized crime cartels presents a considerable and mounting danger to both national and international security, "with dire implications for public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic stability across the globe." 8 As criminal networks get bigger, they broaden their portfolios and aggressively branch out their activities to reduce exposure to specific parts of the enterprise and obfuscate the financial forensics. This diversity has given 3 rise to a "convergence of threats that were once distinct and today have explosive and destabilizing effects. From this analysis, policy and associated authority gaps will be identified and make specific policy implementation recommendations to address these gaps.
Ultimately, this research will inform and empower GCC to better execute their key roles and missions associated with to combating TOC in their area of operations. Illuminating these associations is fundamental to putting the current turbulence in global politics into context. The relationships between these two entities point to the notion that although transnational organized criminal organizations and VEO will use similar tactics techniques and procedures; they are essentially striving for paradoxical goals. Crime is first and foremost an economically motivated endeavor, while violent extremism is firmly oriented towards political, racially prejudiced, xenophobic, or quasi-religious ends. A study funded by the Department of Justice on the subject affirmed that:
…the differences between the two are plentiful: terrorists pursue political or religious objectives through overt violence against civilians and military targets. They turn to crime for the money they need to survive and operate. Criminal groups, on the other hand, are focused on making money. Any use of violence tends to be concealed, and is generally focused on tactical goals such as intimidating witnesses, eliminating competitors or obstructing investigators.
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Security experts have not yet settled on the substance, scope, and functionality of enduring alliances or convergence between TOC networks and VEO. However, the relationship between the two is not stagnant and can be seen as a convergence that under certain conditions might result in the merger of objectives and goals. "The result is a model known as the terror-crime interaction spectrum that depicts the relationship between terror and criminal groups and the different forms it takes." 21 Contained by the spectrum there are mechanisms that the Department of Justice study refers to as "activity appropriation, nexus, symbiotic relationship, hybrid, and transformation." These stages exemplify the diverse forms of interface between a VEO and a TOC enterprise, as well as the behavior of any one network that is engaged in both violent extremism and organized criminal activity. 22 As we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century it is evident that TOC is on the increase and its array of enterprises and networks are a considerable issue for a globalized world and an existential menace to vulnerable states in the international system. The opportunity for expansion of TOC enterprises are expected to continue because of the larger worldwide trend towards the commoditization of goods, services, and people, as well as the increasing economic disparity between urbanized or developed polities and emergent states. Combined with the relative increase in regional conflicts, the challenges to border security and sovereignty, and the continuation of extraction based economic models that limit or hinder local equity there are an abundance of opportunities where politically motivated violent extremists and transnational criminal enterprises can use globalization to exploit common methods and techniques. 23 TOC and violent extremism are increasingly in temporal and physical proximity.
This proximity will increase understanding within TCN realize that there is a profit margin in providing technical and logistical support for violent extremists. It will therefore become in their interests to provide an obscurant function for VEN against their local and regional law enforcement agencies and security sector. Disrupting the support and quasi-operational connections between TCO and VEO has been given only insufficient consideration in the United States. The separation of the two phenomena allows for both VEO and TCO to grow and leverage each other's strengths. 24 Activity appropriation takes place when VEN and TOC implement the other's tactics, techniques, and procedures exclusive of actual unity of effort or combined activities. To increase operating capital, violent extremists have "habitually turn to credit card fraud, drug dealing, money laundering, and smuggling, the staple activities of organized criminals." 25 Using the tools of the criminal is initially an expedient and an acknowledgement of best practices for extralegal activities. However, activity appropriation does not always lead to the next stage on the terror-crime interaction spectrum or a nexus paradigm. Stagnation on the terror-crime interaction spectrum can happen when a violent extremist group sees no benefit in including outsiders in their activities or when no transnational criminal group is willing to endanger profits and draw attention to its enterprise by working with violent extremists.
However, if activity appropriation is occurring it follows that protracted contact or proximity between the criminals and violent extremists are likely. As violent extremists "attempt to acquire forged documents, launder money, or pay bribes, it is a natural step to draw on the support and expertise of the criminal group, which is likely to have more experience in these activities." 26 This typically manifests itself by the transnational criminals providing goods and services to violent extremists for cash or payment in kind.
These transactional relationships do not imply any convergence of ideology or goals, but acknowledges a nexus of interests. Both have need of armaments, safe houses, documentation, transport, secure communications, and real time visibility on law enforcement activities. To leverage economies of scale, efficiency, and shared proficiency the nexus association must serve both group's objectives.
If the nexus described above proves mutually beneficial, the affiliation may 14 TOC has thrived in conflict regions and some post conflict situations.
Peacekeeping and stabilization activities by the international community tend to target the political and security concerns that initiated the conflict or caused it to become part of the international narrative, but not the TCO activities that contributes to its continuance. 30 Within a much larger context, transnational criminality is more apt to flourish "in a large shadow economy, that is, where illicit, unregulated, undeclared, and illegal transactions take place and where there is little legitimate economy." Regions where the central state has lost control over some of its territory.
Regions straddling several national borders or jurisdictions.
Conflict zones where separatists are fighting government forces.
Areas of countries that otherwise have a strong rule of law, but weak control over certain neighborhoods and slums, such as certain emigrant or refugee neighborhoods of major cities.
Penal institutions where correctional authorities are more concerned with maintaining order rather than probing the crime-terrorist interactions within their institutions. 33 As the 2002 National Security Strategy cautions, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones," 34 What has developed from the challenges associated with vulnerable states are evolved forms of illicit activity that goes beyond conventional notions of criminality and terrorism. Vulnerable states have an assortment of complex problems. Most conspicuous is their insufficient capacity to exercise effective sovereignty of their physical domains, the loss of the exclusive right to use deadly force to maintain order or achieve ends, and the inability or disinclination of the state to shield the population from harm. These conditions then engender a lack of state legitimacy, the inability to provide basic social services, and the failure to function responsibly in the international system. 35 As recent history has established, the penalty of not addressing the threat posed by TOC subverting vulnerable states is real. As discussed above, the conditions that make a state vulnerable are similar to those needed for both violent extremism and criminal networks to succeed. Although transnational crime requires some state sponsored infrastructure and stability to thrive in the long run, both can reap short term gains from safe haven within the borders of a weak state and strength within the disorder of societal collapse.
National Interests, Strategies, and Legislative Authorities
The 2010 National Security Strategy espouses the principle that the United
States will position itself "to champion mutual interests among nations and peoples." 36 It further defines the United States' enduring interests as:
Security:
The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners.
Prosperity: A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.
Values: Respect for universal values at home and around the world.
International Order: An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. 37 Within this framework of enduring national interests, the need to sustain an
International Order is primary in that it "will support our efforts to advance security, prosperity, and universal values, but it is also an end that we seek in its own right." 38 The specter of TCO and violent extremism are major threats to a sustainable International Order. From these interests and the National Security Strategy it is reasonable to extrapolate that the policy of the United States to meet these challenges is to "formulate and implement a cooperative strategy with partner states confronting the same threats and challenges." 39 Combating transnational organized criminal enterprises in a globalized environment entails an integrated and wide-ranging whole of government effort. The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime attempts such an approach, but in reality it does little more than serve as a glossy unclassified brochure to increase worldwide understanding about TOC. However, it does provide some specific "policy objectives" which are enumerated below.
1. Protect Americans and our partners from the harm, violence, and exploitation of transnational criminal networks.
3. Break the economic power of transnational criminal networks and protect strategic markets and the U.S. financial system from TOC penetration and abuse.
4. Defeat transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest threat to national security by targeting their infrastructures, depriving them of their enabling means, and preventing the criminal facilitation of terrorist activities.
5. Build international consensus, multilateral cooperation, and publicprivate partnerships to defeat transnational organized crime. Defense Authorization Acts to alternately make available or withdraw authorities and permissions for the Department of Defense in terms of the TOC/VEO portfolio. 45 19
Analysis of the acts shows the reluctance to allow Defense resources and activities to become pooled with those of other departments of the executive branch. This legislative theme shows a uniquely stove-piped approach that seems to be geared more towards oversight (a legitimate legislative function) rather than synchronization and unity of effort. Other than Plan Colombia, the United States Government has failed to produce a truly comprehensive set of authorities that are linked to appropriations and a strategic level operational design.
Other authorities include: Policy have yet to devise cohesive implementation guidance. The imbalance of ends, ways, and means in strategy (unless corrected in implementation policy) is inducing risk in to the system and will have deleterious effects on other actions within this portfolio.
Implementation Policy Recommendations
When approved, the implementation policy should have several basic characteristics to enable success. The first is that the fifty-six "priority actions" in the  Focus on those regions where the central state has lost control over some of its territory and regions straddling several national borders or jurisdictions.
Recommendations to Address Military Capability and Authorities Gaps
Allowing Department of Defense assets to advise partner nation planning process for dual-use forces can help ensure and reinforce partner nation processes for mission analysis, concept development, risk assessment (risk to force, mission, and civilians), intelligence gaps, decision points, proportionality, and rules on use of force.
Advising partner nation dual-use forces during tactical actions 57 
Conclusion
The threat of conventional military action against United States enduring interests from recognized state actors has diminished globally. However, the asymmetric threat to United States national security and to a more generally stable international order posed by a TOC/VEO convergence remains a genuine possibility. Lucrative profits continue to make it possible for TCN to enhance their operational capability and build capacity faster than many of our regional partner state's security sectors and judicial systems are able to adapt. There are indications that VEN are learning to leverage TCN structures for illicit trafficking and finance. This can enable movement along the terrorcrime interaction spectrum, eventually expand, and deepen the convergence between TCO and VEO. Although ideology and goals remain generally distinct between the two, there is no indication that this will remain so. As vulnerable partner states address their own interests, the United States must continue to pursue policies that recognize the primacy of diplomacy and economic statecraft in persuading partners of our mutual interests, but also the efficacy of a coordinated approach with the Unites States.
Strategically the United States must determine how to address the risk caused by the imbalance between its goals or ends within the TCO portfolio and its ways and means. The current lack of effectual implementation guidance and associated authorities to support espoused national strategic continue to create a significant imbalance in relation to ways and ends. Similarly, our fiscal inability to make relatively small investments now in coordinated whole of government action that leverages existing capacity may create a significant imbalance in relation to means and ways later.
This may eventually cause the United States even greater fiscal imbalance as small regional issues potentially transform into larger and more complex threats closer to the homeland. Rather than encourage the notion that defense, diplomacy, and development are coequal or can be synchronized to common effect the United States should engage its domestic audience and partners alike in a hard dialogue about "priorities, requirements, tradeoffs, and limitations." 
